Abstract. -This article looks at the rebellion of the Irish Legion at Riohacha, New Granada (Colombia), in 1820. It highlights the Atlantic networks of politics, commerce, and migration upon which Colombia's independence from Spain took place. These networks catalysed thinking about changing notions of masculinities and collective identities in this period. The sources for the article are archival documents in Dublin and Bogotá, and newspaper reports and private correspondence that reflected on the events in question. The Irish Legion served the cause of Independence in Colombia under the command of Simón Bolívar, and it was largely envisaged as a brave and generous Irish contribution to the cause of liberty. The Legion's rebellion thus caused numerous reinterpretations of their motives, both at home in Ireland and amongst Hispanic Americans. The article provides a brief narrative of events and traces the ripples of their consequences in Riohacha itself and away in Bogotá. The study emphasises how identity formation in early nineteenth-century Hispanic America (including local, regional, national, colonial, and imperial identities) was a flexible and contested process based on understandings of masculinity and race, and influenced by often unexpected events such as hunger, looting, ambush, and desertion. This paper explores changing notions of masculinities and collective identities across Atlantic networks of politics and migration in the early nineteenth century. It uses the substantial documentation triggered on both sides of the Atlantic by the rebellion of an Irish Legion 1 This paper was written with the support of a European Union Marie-Curie Fellowship held at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide in Sevilla. Previous research in Colombia, Venezuela, and Ireland was supported by the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland and the Graduate School of University College London. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Spanish language documents are my own.
in the service of the Independents in the war against Spanish colonial rule, at Riohacha in May 1820. The first part of the paper provides a short narrative of the agreed course of events, followed by a brief overview of the Colombian and Irish historiographies. It situates Irish involvement in the Colombian Wars of Independence within the contemporary Atlantic political and economic situation, and explains the presence of several hundred Irish soldiers in a conflict in which Britain remained neutral. The second part provides a brief introduction to two of the principal protagonists of the rebellion, Mariano Montilla and Luis Brion. The third part examines the consequences of the rebellion in Riohacha and Bogotá.
2
The Atlantic world in the early nineteenth century consisted of interwoven networks of trade, politics, empire, migration, and ideology. As Mimi Scheller has observed for the Caribbean, "long before the current fashion for studying 'new' transnational identities, the peoples and histories of 'national' entities intertwined and interacted with each other".
3 Encounters above and beyond national and colonial boundaries were complicated by class, gender, and caste or "race". This paper explores one of the occasions where all these networks connected, and where the tension caused by their multiple pressures caused an explosion: in this case, the violent insurrection of Irish soldiers in a peripheral New Granadan port. It is therefore an "anatomy of a rebellion", albeit one which stresses the transnational nature of the causes and consequences of the events at the same time as retaining the focus on the local. 4 The consequences of the personal 78 Matthew Brown 2 Relations with the metropolitan capitals, London and Madrid, were of vital importance to these networks, but they have been excluded from this study in order to emphasise that colonial and imperial identities in the early nineteenth century did not always revolve around a colony-metropolis framework, and to emphasise how identity formation took place in complex networks of sites away from the formal boundaries of colonial rule. I expand on the Irish dimension, and in particular the situation in Dublin, in Matthew Brown, "The Irish Rebellion in Colombia" (unpublished paper). mobility of the Irish adventurers cast into fine relief the international and Atlantic context of the Hispanic American Wars of Independence, which the Irish Legion encountered in the midst of the transition from colonial to republican rule.
5
A principal component of the masculinity of Irish adventurers and of Hispanic American military and political elites alike during the Wars of Independence was to avoid the charge of cowardice.
6 Cowards backed away from danger where the adventurer and soldier hero confronted risk in order to win greater gains for his own honour and for the patria. Events in South America were central to constructions of masculinity in this period because of the "culture of adventure" that shaped British and Irish experience in the region.
7 Dreams of glory, wealth, and fortune were counterpointed against a constructed "landscape of adventure" in which chroniclers emphasised the physical dangers of the environment (fevers, alligators, savage Indians) in order to highlight their own achievements in surviving and returning home more "manly" as a result.
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS
The Wars of Independence in Spanish America (c. 1810 -c. 1825) attracted attention across the Atlantic region. The authorities in London, Madrid, Moscow, Paris, Port-au-Prince, the Vatican, and Washington debated the merits of diplomatic recognition of the new states. Corsairs and privateers supported by the new independent republics harassed shipping off the coast of West Africa.
8 The British government adopted an ambiguous position due to its official support of Spain as a European ally and unwillingness to do anything that might encourage French expansionism in the Western Hemisphere.
9 Instead, it tolerated the departure from its shores of over six thousand adventurers to fight against Spain in Colombia.
10 Many died of fevers in tropical climates, but others contributed to the eventual victory of the Independents and thereafter settled in the region.
On 6th October 1819, the port of Riohacha was occupied by a force of three hundred men "of all nations", led by the Scottish adventurer Gregor MacGregor.
11 This was part of Simón Bolívar's strategy to distract the Spanish colonial forces while he embarked on the campaign that led to victories inland at Pantano de Vargas (25th July 1819) and Boyacá (7th August 1819).
12 In the face of renewed local resistance, MacGregor fled after six days. The local authorities suffered four months of tension under the threat of another sea borne attack until their fears were realised when Bolívar destined the Irish Legion, newly arrived from Europe, for the same area of coast as a means to capturing the valuable, and staunchly Loyalist port of Maracaibo.
13 On 10 The expeditions are discussed at length in Eric Lambert, Voluntarios británicos e irlandeses en la gesta bolivariana, vol. 1 (Caracas 1983) and vols. 2-3 (Caracas 1990), and Brown, Impious Adventurers (note 7). The vast majority of adventurers served in the territories whose liberation from Spanish rule was led by Simón Bolívar: the CaptaincyGeneral of Venezuela, the Viceroyalty of New Granada, and the Presidency of Quito. The republic formed from this region was called Colombia until its disintegration in 1830. Historians now refer to this entity as "Gran Colombia" to differentiate it from New Granada, which assumed the name Colombia in 1863. 14 This ended the Spanish Crown's formal control of the territory, and the Independents' control of the region was confirmed when news of the rebellion of Spanish troops at Cádiz on 1st January 1820 finally arrived in South America.
15
Montilla left a small detachment to defend his conquest and led the majority of the Irish Legion into the interior in order to fulfil his orders from Bolívar to join forces with a column led by General Lara. Not encountering Lara, who had been delayed further south, Montilla's forces turned around and returned to Riohacha. On 13th May, the Irish Legion refused to continue in the Independents' service, and they were embarked on ships waiting to take them to Jamaica. From there, they dispersed across the North Atlantic world. Some stayed in the British Caribbean, working on plantations, while others arranged transport home or to other colonies in North America. A few Irishmen set out independently on small vessels and were washed up in nearby Loyalist ports like Santa Marta where, bedraggled and desperate, they begged the authorities to send them "anywhere".
16 A few regained their good health and returned to Colombia to serve the Independents in the later stages of the war.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
The rebellion of the Irish Legion at Riohacha has been described with scorn by many historians, especially from those with military backgrounds. In Colombia, the rebellious Irish were described by early military chroniclers, such as Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, as spiteful and bitter mercenaries, and their "barbarity" was contrasted with the "heroism" of other foreigners involved in the wars.
17 Vicente Lecuna blamed the Irish for the failure of an important strategic expedition.
18
As such, the Irish Legion was demonised to serve historiographical goals of glorifying other actors in the Wars of Independence. In their urge to describe rum-thirsty and violence-hungry Irish marauders, some of these historians followed factually incorrect contemporary narratives. The initial occupation of Riohacha occurred in March and the rebellion two months later. Most excessively, Guillermo Plazas Olarte wrote that the Irishmen found Riohacha unoccupied and that, "drunk on victory and aguardiente, they sacked the town and then set fire to it".
19 In one of the few blemishes on the latest and most impressive study of the wars that avoids many of these pitfalls, Clément Thibaud discussed the Riohacha rebellion as if it were peripheral and unrelated to the larger processes he treated.
Although it does not deal with the Irish Legion's rebellion at Riohacha, there is a North Atlantic academic current that runs close to this stream, stressing the precocious and often inherent rebellious tendencies of "the Irish" in comparison to their "British" counterparts. 21 The presentation of the event in Irish historiography diverges slightly from these interpretations, neither glorifying nor demonising Irish subversion. Instead, the Riohacha rebellion has been effectively sidelined and pigeon-holed. The extensive research of Eric Lambert has been largely neglected by historians of the diaspora or Irish involvement in the British Empire. Lambert's failure to synthesise his own investigations or to present them to an audience beyond his narrow specialisation meant that his Spanish-language tomes lie neglected in only a few libraries, despite the wide range of sources consulted and their interest to students of the "Irish abroad".
22 Indeed, most other histories of the Irish abroad or in Latin America avoid the subject of the rebellion at Riohacha.
Unlike the Venezuelan or Colombian historians, who sought to contrast Irish mutiny with native loyalty and patriotism, Lambert blamed cultural factors, especially "mutual incomprehension" between Creole leaders and the Irish.
23 Indeed, Lambert's interpretation was a refinement of the contemporary claim that the Irish were "naturally" mutinous by virtue either of their low social status, lack of military experience, or national character. Here, I attempt to move beyond essentialist cultural explanations and to explore the geographical, social, and economic networks within which the Riohacha rebellion took place. 
LUIS BRION AND MARIANO MONTILLA
Two of the principal protagonists require brief introductions. The letters they wrote in the immediate aftermath of the rebellion were scattered across the Atlantic world and conditioned much of the subsequent writing about the events. In the absence of the leader of the Irish Legion, General John Devereux (who did not arrive in Venezuela until mid-1820, by which time the vast majority of his men had deserted or were dead), Simón Bolívar chose Colonel Mariano Montilla to lead the terrestrial operations and Admiral Luis Brion to organise the maritime transport. Montilla (b. 1782 Caracas, d. 1851 Caracas) was Venezuelan by birth, like Bolívar a member of the Caracas elite, and fiercely loyal to his patron. In the words of one adventurer, Montilla was "a worthy man, a brave soldier, and an accomplished gentleman. He has made the tour of Europe".
24 Montilla saw the attack on Riohacha as an opportunity to prove his worth to Bolívar and was anxious that the "terrible quality" of the "raw recruits" he had been entrusted with would undermine his honourable reputation.
25 Positioning himself as the representation of civilisation against Irish barbarity, Montilla mocked what he perceived as an Irish superiority complex with regard to South Americans. He wrote that "they believe themselves lords of all the land they walk on, and entitled to do what they wish to the inhabitants if they don't find there the means of satisfying their ambition".
26
Central to Montilla's interpretation of the events at Riohacha was his special concern to maintain his own reputation. Because the Irish refused to acknowledge his authority in March 1820, he argued that these "vagabonds and ruffians" lacked manliness and were inveterate "cowards [...] who turned around as soon as they saw the enemy approach".
27 Montilla directed most of his scorn at the private soldiers who had disregarded the rules that should have kept them in their place in the military hierarchy, and subverted the social distinctions that had hitherto continued (and would henceforth continue) to govern the conduct of the war. If an Irish officer displayed loyalty and bravery, then for Montilla, he was no longer Irish but was instead subsumed within the wider "Colombian" identity. This was most apparent when he praised "the one hundred and fifty marines, the majority of who are Creoles, who took the vanguard under the command of Colonels García and Jación". 28 This latter figure was Thomas Jackson, an Irishman. All this was intended to blame "the Irish" and to excuse Montilla's responsibility for the mutiny under his command, a goal which he successfully accomplished. The "Irish" were scapegoated for the events, and Montilla continued to occupy prestigious positions in the Colombian army throughout the 1820s. Montilla articulated his view of Irish cowardice in letters written after the events in question.
Admiral Luis Brion (b. 1782 Curacao, d. 1821 Curacao) was less diplomatic.
29 When Montilla was chosen by Bolívar, the Irish Legion demanded that he should be accompanied by Brion, a wealthy merchant whose substantial investment in the Independents' cause earned him the command of the naval forces. The minister of war, Diego Bautista Urbaneja, warned that this would be the only time that he would bow to Irish complaints, as "these troops, insubordinate in their very nature, must not get used to choosing their own chiefs".
30 Indeed, their loyalty to Brion quickly evaporated in the heat of Riohacha, and their feelings were reciprocated. According to William Lowe, captain of the British vessel Betsy Ann, Admiral Brion "repeatedly called [the Irish Legion] cowards, which they considered to be a lack of respect, and to add insult to their injuries".
31 Lowe believed that this insult was the trigger that caused the Irish to leave the "country that offered them nothing but misery and ingratitude".
According to Lowe, Brion vetoed a compromise proposal that would have allowed the Irish officers to take an expedition to Santa Marta, "allowing them to take whatever property they could find in the region or indeed any other area that they could capture". 32 Brion had come to believe that the presence of foreign troops under his command was prejudicial to the goal of converting the hearts and minds of the local population. He told the Jamaica merchant Duncan Mackintosh that "the inhabitants here [on the Caribbean coast] have developed such hatred for the foreign troops (and with good reason), that they would rather join the royalist troops than us". He continued that "I would abandon the service immediately if I ever saw another band of similar bandits trying to invade this sacred land".
33
By calling the Irish "bandits" and highlighting their mercenary motivations, Brion attempted to re-situate his own reputation. Brion was a wealthy man who had invested a great deal of his own fortune in the wars. Nevertheless, as a foreigner himself -as a Jew as well as someone born outside of Hispanic America -, his dedication to the "cause" had to be constantly re-affirmed. Like Montilla he was educated, urbane, spoke good French (which enabled both to converse with educated Irish officers like O'Connor without the need for translators) and initially gained the loyalty of his subordinates.
34
For their own reasons, then, both Brion and Montilla made much of Irish "character" in assessing the events at Riohacha. They contrasted their own reputations, which had previously merited the "respect and consideration [ and encouraged the dismissal of their pay and ration demands as "unrealistic".
36 They described the rebellion as "the most detestable and ignominious act in the history of war".
37 Contrasting themselves with the "mercenary" and "cowardly" Irish Legion was the ideal way of asserting their own loyalty, honour, and masculinity. It was in the port of Riohacha where the interconnected Atlantic networks behind the Wars of Independence became physically manifest.
It was in Riohacha that Montilla's and Brion's concepts of masculinity and loyalty clashed with those held by Irish adventurers, but the port was not a blank field upon which these conflicts could be played out. Ongoing internal developments in Riohacha society had recently been affected by the incursions of other foreign actors, and these changes -in concepts of allegiance, masculinity, service, and community -all contributed to the events that led to the rebellion of the Irish Legion.
RIOHACHA
Riohacha, a small port on the Goajira peninsula on the Caribbean coast of New Granada, was connected to Atlantic networks in a variety of ways. Since the sixteenth-century conquest it had remained a colonial outpost of Spanish rule, with its hinterland occupied by unconquered Indians, the Goajira, who established complex relations of resistance and cooperation with their Hispanic neighbours.
38 The Goajira also frequently allied themselves with foreigners for trade and defence purposes throughout the colonial period. Riohacha itself gained significant prosperity by exploiting its geographical position to act as an unofficial contraband entrepôt for British and Dutch merchants from Jamaica and Curaçao.
The peninsula itself consisted mainly of desert, which made water supply extremely problematic for travelling armies. Some slave plantations littered the coast, but the largely unwelcoming topography of mountains, marshland, and desert meant that New Granada's coastal towns were isolated from the rest of the Viceroyalty, especially so for Riohacha, even by the high standards of isolation common in the region. 39 The colonial order felt increasingly vulnerable from within. The 1788 census of the town of Riohacha revealed 1,463 free nonwhites, 392 slaves, 181 whites, 11 Indians, and 7 clerics. 40 In the early nineteenth century, memories of the slave revolt in Haiti were still present on the Caribbean coast, and these affected relations between people of colour and Creole elites.
41 Late colonial military reforms had concentrated on the more important port of Cartagena de Indias and thus left Riohacha at risk from concerted attack by sea. The repeated foreign attacks on Riohacha led to a heightened sense of anxiety in the town about the nature of allegiance to king, country, and region. This was particularly rife in the months leading up to the occupation of the town by the Irish Legion, which saw heated recriminations over the part played by the local population in receiving and accommodating Gregor MacGregor's troops during his occupation of the town in October 1819.
42
When José Solis was re-instated as governor upon MacGregor's departure, he attempted to cement his authority. He arrested all those who had associated with the occupiers and made every effort to forcibly stamp out dissent.
43 Fundamental to Solis's fears was the apparent ease with which Riohachero men had developed relations of familiarity with the enemy that went against what should have been their natural loyalty to the King of Spain. It seemed to Solis, from the evidence collected, that the insurgents had subverted their natural identities as subjects of the Spanish monarch in the name of merce- nary self-interest. 44 One man was accused of enjoying "ostentatious friendship" with the foreigners. 45 These relations triggered deep uncertainty with regard to allegiance to the re-established order. Aniseto Rodriguez, who MacGregor appointed to organise the Independents' defence of the town, was accused of trying to persuade his old colleagues that "just as you used to serve the King, now you can serve the patria".
46 Such a simple transfer of loyalty was too superficial for many of those questioned (who were, of course, now anxious to stress their loyalty to the revengeful governor). In their testimonies, several residents of Riohacha claimed that they had replied that they "could not serve the patria, because [they] did not want to fight against their brothers".
47 That is to say, they evoked notions of kinship linking them to Spain against the mercenary idea of the patria proposed by Aniseto Rodriguez and linked in their minds to foreigners like MacGregor.
After MacGregor had gone in mid-October, life in Riohacha returned to something approaching its pre-occupation normality. Accused and accusers lived next door to each other. 48 In addition to the fear of renewed attack, a new uncertainty had been brought into collective and individual identities. Miguel Gómez, a Loyalist who led the defence forces of Goajira Indians, expressed his dismay that "those who call themselves whites" were involved in intrigue against the Governor. Gómez lamented that the enemy was not, as it should be, "the one that comes from outside", and that order had been reduced to 89 Rebellion at Riohacha, 1820 44 "Declaración de Mateo Bermúdez", 22nd January 1820, Riohacha: AGI, Cuba, Legajo 745, "Causa criminal seguida contra Ramón Ruiz, por delito de infidencia admitiendo el empleo de alferez de las tropas que hivan a poner sobre las armas los insurgentes en defensa de la patria".
45 "Causa criminal seguida contra Felipe Rosado cabo 1º", 26th January 1820, Riohacha: AGI, Cuba, Legajo 745.
46 "Declaración de Bartolo Moreno", 19th January 1820, Riohacha: AGI, Cuba, Legajo 745, "Causa criminal seguida contra José Aniseto Rodriguez, por delito de infidencia, y por admisión del empleo de coronel y comandante de las tropas que intentaron poner sobre las armas los insurgentes". 47 For example "Declaración de Mateo Bermúdez", 20th January 1820, Riohacha: AGI, Cuba, Legajo 745, "Causa criminal seguida contra José Aniseto Rodriguez".
48 According to the testimony of Mateo Bermúdez, the accused (Rodriguez) lived in a house next to that of Mateo Llorens, one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. "Declaración de Mateo Bermúdez", 26th January 1820, Riohacha: AGI, Cuba, Legajo 745, "Causa criminal seguida contra Felipe Rosado cabo 1º".
chaos.
49 The alliance of Riohacheros with foreign rebels disorientated collective identities, where the Indians of Goajira showed more loyalty to the King than did the whites of Riohacha. On the eve of the arrival of the Irish Legion, the role of "mercenaries" in political and military conflict was extremely confused, introducing a new element to colonial social and caste hierarchies. When the Governor himself wrote of the "auxiliary contingents, the offering of a barbarous people to the cause, people without morals or religion who will support who pays them the most", he was not speaking of the Irishmen who attacked his town, but rather the Goajira Indians who had assured his return to power. 50 For the Loyalist authorities, masculinity became increasingly based on demonstrations of "faith, loyalty and love", and whether they liked it or not, this necessarily led to a change in the status of nonwhite men like the Goajira, who were now more likely to be considered "men".
51 At least in theory, any man could be faithful to the King, loyal to his representatives, and express these allegiances through love. 52 Caste and class distinctions were henceforth loosened a little in this time of crisis.
53
When the Irish Legion arrived, therefore, their attack was perceived as presenting a continuation of colonial pirate raids and the independent sorties of MacGregor. Many Riohacheros lived in fear of attack. Every time a ship passed across the horizon, the defences were made ready. 54 Solis noted that "if MacGregor attacks again, or if Brion's expedition hits us, or Bolívar does, as I have been informed will happen, then we will be sorely troubled". 55 When they gathered opposite the port to begin their attack, Miguel Gómez claimed that "these foreigners will be scared to death of the Goajira Indians [...] just like their predecessors were".
56
When the Irish Legion anchored outside the port of Riohacha on 11th March 1820, the sounds of their cannons reverberated through the town. 57 The Independents sent a message that they wished to avoid "shedding blood pointlessly", and that they only wished to "incorporate Riohacha into the great Colombian family" and to defeat "our enemies the European Spaniards". 58 With this inclusive message, they hoped to create links between the Irish mercenaries and the Creoles and Indians of Riohacha, isolating the Spaniards of European birth. The Governor ordered cannons to be fired in response and gathered together one hundred and fifty men to hold the defences. But in the face of rampant desertion, by five in the afternoon, Solis was left with only twenty-five men. He therefore joined those running for the surrounding hills.
59
With the occupation of Riohacha by the Irish Legion, documentation from the Spanish archives dries up. Sources for the events of 13th March 1820 onwards come overwhelmingly from Irish and Independent sources. Mosquera recalled that Montilla had told him that "Riohacha's richer inhabitants didn't want the Irish to hang around as they remembered the sacking and looting they had received at the hands of MacGregor's adventurers the previous year". 60 There was also some looting by the retreating Loyalists, so the town probably had little to offer prospective Irish pillagers.
61
Nevertheless, it is clear that concepts of masculinity and collective identity in Riohacha were undergoing profound change before the arrival of the Irish, and that their incursion catalysed rather than created the conditions for change. Men with good honourable reputations had been accused of intrigue against the King, and subordinate groups such as the Goajira were now the bastions of Loyalist defence.
62 The authorities still struggled to see these Indians, with their tradition of resistance to colonial rule, as anything other than barbarians. As a result of the Independent occupation of Riohacha, the region lost its formal allegiance to the King and was incorporated into Bolívar's Colombia. In the post-Independence years, the "socio-racial and ethnic boundaries still existed [... but] they were essentially different from the ones that had been prevalent".
63 The previously closed colonial community of honourable masculinity was opened up to new groups -with restricted access, of course -in the republican period, and these groups included Indians, blacks, and foreigners.
BOGOTÁ
In September 1819, Simón Bolívar entered the colonial capital of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, Santafé de Bogotá. Situated on a highaltitude plain in the Andes, at a distance (by mule and then by boat) of around three months from Riohacha, Bogotá was in communication terms just as far from Riohacha as was Dublin. It was much easier for Riohacheros to communicate with Kingston in Jamaica than it was with Bogotá, and the similar situation for Cartagena de Indias resulted in the development of a distinctive costeño identity, literally "of the coast", in opposition to "the highlands".
64 Bolívar's capture of the capital of the Viceroyalty of New Granada marked an important symbolic turning point in the war. In 1820, Colombia's capital was moved from Angostura on the Orinoco to Cúcuta, a small town equidistant between the colonial Audiencias of Caracas and Bogotá, and also about halfway between Bogotá and Riohacha. Bogotá's residents exerted growing influence over the Independents' strategy and policy.
Bogotá had a population of around 30,000 at the end of the eighteenth century, with an agricultural labour force provided by mestizos and the many indigenous peoples who lived in the surrounding countryside. 65 In similar fashion to Riohacha, Bogotá was largely neglected by colonial militia reforms. The capital was felt to be protected from attack by the long distance and difficult terrain that separated it from its perceived enemies. 66 Unlike on the Caribbean coast, black slavery was virtually non-existent in the highlands. Riohacha was, to all extents but one, a different country from Bogotá, and the exception was crucial: Riohacha formed part of the territory of the newly-declared Colombian republic, and therefore events there reflected upon the attempts of leaders like Bolívar to create and maintain a sense of "Colombian" identity to overlay pre-existing regional and local loyalties.
When the news arrived in August, Bogotano reactions to the Irish rebellion at Riohacha were varied according to interest and politics, and determined by perceptions of the class, national identity, and race of the participants. 67 The Colombian cabinet minister, José Manuel Restrepo, categorised the news of Riohacha as "desertion" based on financial grievances. 68 Bolívar, who passed through Bogotá in this period, popularised this interpretation in a characteristically blunt dismissal of the troops whose recruitment he had personally encouraged. In doing so, Bolívar relied upon popular stereotypes of Irish indiscipline which he could have picked up on his travels to London in 1810 or to Kingston in 1814, or from the British officers who served under him. The Irish expedition to Riohacha was useful to Bolívar because it occupied enemy resources far away from the terrestrial battlefields of the interior. 69 After the rebellion, Bolívar scapegoated the Irish in order to fur-ther define the new nation of "Colombia" in terms of loyalty and subordination to his rule and to the new Colombian institutions he had created. The Irish were presented as rebelling against his new order, and consequently were unpatriotic and dishonourable. Claiming not to be surprised by the Irish Legion's behaviour, Bolívar told Montilla that "I feared that these murderers were capable of anything if they weren't paid -just like those courtesans who don't put out until you've paid up front. So I have been pleased to see the departure of such vile mercenaries".
70
For the Independent leaders, cowardice was as dangerous as insubordination. Briceño Méndez stated that the Irish Legion's "terrible and scandalous conduct was unworthy of our flag". 71 Irish cowardice was presented as an insult to the honour of all Colombians. Just as bad, regardless of their unreliability in battle, the Irish had made plain their exaggerated opinions of what they deserved. Rebellions like theirs dishonoured the Independent forces.
72 That is, they made explicit the paradox of the traditional social hierarchies that Bolívar and other Creole leaders hoped would underpin the new Colombian republic.
Daniel O'Leary, Bolívar's Irish aide-de-camp, was also in Bogotá at the time of the rebellion. He recorded his impressions a decade later, when writing his memoirs in Jamaica. His influential narrative and documentary collection was compiled in the early 1830s, while he was exiled from Colombia after the disgrace and death of his patron Simón Bolívar. O'Leary's interpretation of the events has been privileged by (especially English-reading) historians in the light of the rehabilitation of Bolívar's reputation.
73 O'Leary blamed poor leadership rather than any particular "national" Irish insubordination that could have led to 72 Other rebellions of foreign troops (discussed in Brown, Impious Adventurers (note 7), p. 129, 165-169, 222) were dealt with through summary executions, and were henceforth brushed under the carpet by the authorities. Because of their perceived national difference, the Irish rebellion at Riohacha provided an opportunity for the construction of revolutionary masculinity in opposition to Irish insubordination and cowardice, which was precluded in the other instances by the need to maintain British diplomatic and commercial support.
73 For example Jay Kinsbruner, Independence in Spanish America: Civil Wars, Revolutions and Underdevelopment (1st ed. Albuquerque 1973, revised ed. 1994), p. 80-85. comparison between black slaves and the Irish. He argued that if they had been led by Bolívar rather than sadly mismanaged by Montilla, the rebellion at Riohacha would never have occurred. 74 It was another example, for O'Leary, of other Creoles failing to live up to the high standards set by Bolívar.
The Irish rebellion at Riohacha, then, was less a strategic inconvenience than a potentially dishonourable example and a crucial tool in the construction of a "national" Colombian identity. Briceño Méndez wrote that "the Republic does not need soldiers who, far from coming to serve it, come to destroy it and to scandalise it with their subversive example and shocking crimes". 75 Those who might be inspired by this precedent, of course, were the pardos, freed slaves, and indigenous troops whose colonial rebellions had been largely limited to individual and small-scale resistance, marronage, or urban uprisings. The explicit claims made by the Irish for the fulfilment of revolutionary rhetoric could not be tolerated because the Irish "example [... could cause other groups to] believe themselves authorised to take similar measures".
76
Only those Irish adventurers who had not served in the Irish Legion (and there were many of them) felt able to reclaim their Irish identity as individuals. John Johnston, one of the senior officials in the British Legion, petitioned the Colombian government in late 1822 arguing that "being from a country like Ireland, that has always been struggling to be free I acquired at birth the most liberal sentiments that could possibly fill a man's heart".
77 But officers like Johnston were primarily seen as Colombian rather than Irish, a term which had become synonymous at this stage with cowardice and insubordination. The reverberations of such a development were not slow to reach Ireland.
CONCLUSIONS
The consequences of the Riohacha rebellion for Irish identity back in Dublin were very different. The 1801 union between Great Britain and Ireland had explicitly transferred the focal point of Irish political life across the Irish Sea. It had considerable consequences for conceptions of collective "Irish" or "Catholic" identity in Ireland, and as such affected ideas of masculinity amongst men at all levels of society. The collective identity of the Irish Legion had originally been based on notions of brave manliness in adventuring overseas. The apparent failure of this manliness (emphasised by the early return of many volunteers in 1819 and by the subsequent rebellion at Riohacha in 1820) caused consternation back in Dublin. The immense amount of newspaper coverage given to the Irish Legion in 1819 and 1820 in the Dublin press demonstrates how important these independent foreign adventures had become to a sense of Irish identity. 78 Irish courage was held against its counterpoint, South American cowardice. O'Connor blamed the lack of manliness shown by South Americans, by "the native Generals not wanting to fight and win like soldiers". 79 The residents of Riohacha were "cowards" for supporting the Loyalists.
80
Francis Hall noted that the "disappointed adventurers" who returned had lacked "sufficient penetration" to deal with the landscape of adventure they encountered in South America. 81 It is no coincidence that the language was highly gendered: fundamental issues of masculinity were at stake.
The Dublin press tried to cast blame on non-Irish officers for inspiring insubordination. 82 It singled out Brion for the "most cruel and dis-astrous" fate of the Irish Legion, which had been "disarmed, betrayed and plundered". The Dublin Evening Post dismissed the possibility of mutiny, claiming that "the foulest treachery was practised against them". 83 The DEP hoped to find succour in the common Irish soldier's loyalty and bravery, whose only wish was an opportunity to serve nobly in return for an honest remuneration.
84
The attempt to forge an Irish identity through adventure in South America was thwarted by the difficulties of the Goajira peninsula. The Riohacha rebellion in 1820 demonstrates the transnational and intracolonial networks that linked the North Atlantic, the Caribbean, and Spanish America during the latter's transition from colonial to republican rule. Networks of trade (both formal and contraband), migration, ideas, labour, and politics were all intermeshed and interconnected. It is worth re-emphasising the role of the indigenous people of Goajira (in both representation and reality) in triggering the Irish rebellion at Riohacha. Linda Colley has suggested that in North America "[...] the belief that Indian violence was at once hideously cruel and unpredictable, explains why some British troops (including men who had faced other enemies with equanimity) deserted rather than do battle with them, or simply resigned themselves helplessly to death in the face of their attack".
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In Riohacha, the Irish Legion became convinced that violent protest was the only way that authorities would possibly recognise the grievances of subordinate groups like themselves. Goajira resistance to the intruders, through hostility, ambushes, and reluctance to provide provisions was influential in encouraging the Irish to take an opportunity to leave when it arose. After spending time on the island of Margarita in late 1819, the Irish soldiers had heard the tales of disease and the barbarity of the war from troops who had arrived earlier. When the Irish marched through the Goajira peninsula, they were already steeped in the imaginative geography that portrayed South America as a "landscape of adventure". After marching through the unknown and hostile interior, in which their worst fears of ambush and captivity were occasionally realised, the Irish Legion returned to the clear blue horizon of the Caribbean. It should be little surprise that, when faced with the sight of several favourable Jamaican merchant ships prepared to carry them away to comfort and solace, they made the decision to leave.
The consequences of their departure reshaped the political landscape in Riohacha and also reverberated around the Caribbean and as far as Dublin and Bogotá, casting into relief the multi-layered networks of race, class, politics, trade, and gender upon which masculinities and collective identities were constructed in 1820. The conditions that created looting and rebellion were specific to this part of the coast and the circumstances of this period of the war. Very few other locations would have had neutral shipping available to evacuate the Irish by sea. Had a rebellion occurred in the Apure, deeper into the Magdalena, or indeed at another less frequented port, Independent chiefs would have had to be more flexible with the Irish, or would have physically suppressed the rebellion.
In the long-term, Creole elites wanted alliance with the British in order to attract financial investment and diplomatic recognition. The Irish were not essential to this aim, and they therefore became convenient scapegoats in Bogotá. Creoles absorbed English stereotypes about the Irish just as the adventurers absorbed Creole stereotypes of savage Indians. The construction of masculinities was an integral part of these networks of mutual exchange. The rebellion of the Irish Legion at Riohacha in 1820 demonstrated how conceptions of service, masculinity, and collective identity were changing across the Atlantic in the early nineteenth century. The changes took place at different rates in Riohacha and Bogotá and Dublin, and the processes often diverged in completely different directions, according to the weight of factors such as topography, demography, geopolitics, and war. They were interconnected processes: none can really be understood without the others. The union between Britain and Ireland, the abolition of the slave trade to the British colonies, and the transition from colonial to republican rule in Hispanic America had myriad and interlocking consequences across the Atlantic world. The future of such a changing world was uncertain, yet the charge of cowardice remained loaded with meaning.
